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Abstract
This note is a part of my efforts for getting rid of nonlocality
from quantum mechanics (QM). Quantum nonlocality is two faced
Janus, one face is Lu¨ders projection nonlocality, another face is Bell
nonlocality. This paper is devoted to disillusion of the latter. The
main casualty of Bell’s model with hidden variables is that it straight-
forwardly contradicts to the Heinsenberg’s uncertainty and generally
Bohr’s complementarity principles. Thus, we do not criticize the
derivation or interpretation of the Bell inequality (as was done by
numerous authors). Our critique is directed against the model as it
is. The original Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen (EPR) argument was based
on the Heinseberg’s principle, but EPR did not question it. Hence,
the arguments of EPR and Bell differ crucially. It is worth to find the
physical seed of the aforementioned principles. This is the quantum
postulate: the existence of indivisible quantum of action. Bell’s ap-
proach with hidden variable straightforwardly implies rejection of the
quantum postulate. Heisenberg compared the quantum postulate with
constancy of light’s velocity in special relativity. Thus attempts to ex-
plain long distance correlations within the Bell model can be compared
with attempts to construct models violating the laws of relativity the-
ory. Following Zeilinger, I search for the fundamental principles of
quantum mechanics (QM) similar to the principles of relativity and
consider the quantum action and complementarity principles as such
principles.
1
1 Introduction
Recently I published a series of papers which can be unified by the
slogan “getting rid of nonlocality from quantum physics” [1]-[4]. The
wide use of the notion of quantum nonlocality overshadows the real
output of quantum theory, mystifies it, generates unjustified expecta-
tions and speculative interviews for mass-media of otherwise very re-
spectable scientists. The aim is to decouple nonlocality from quantum
theory. The main message of aforementioned papers is that quantum
theory is local, that “spooky action at a distance” was just shicky Ein-
stein’s slogan [6] from a letter to Born in 1947 [7]. Einstein directed
it against the individual interpretation of a quantum state. This in-
terpretation is often referred as the Copenhagen interpretation of QM.
From his viewpoint, one should either reject this interpretation or
confront with spooky action at a distance (see paper [5] for details
and the probabilistic analysis). This viewpoint was especially clearly
presented in letters’ exchange between Einstein and Schro¨dinger [8].
One of complications in getting rid of nonlocality from QM is that
so-called “quantum nonlocality” is two faced Janus [5] (see also Ap-
pendix 1). People freely refer to his different faces, mix them, and
often cannot distinguish them. Two faces of nonlocality Janus are
• Lu¨ders nonlocalty: apparent nonlocality of QM based on the
projection postulate and discussed in the EPR-paper [9]1;
• Bell nonlocality: subquantum nonlocality based on misleading
interpretation of violation of the Bell inequalities [23]-[26].
Typically by saying “quantum nonlocality” one does not specify
whether this is Lu¨ders or Bell nonlocalty (often a debater even does
not understand the difference between these nonlocalities). So, the
first step to elimination of nonlocality from quantum theory is learn-
ing its Janus-like structure (Appendix 1); see paper [5] devoted to
illuminating this structure and disillusion of Lu¨ders nonlocalty.
In paper [1], violation of the Bell inequalities was treated in the
purely quantum framework, i.e., without coupling to hidden variables
1In fact, the most consistent representation of this nonlocality can be found in Aspect’s
papers [10, 11]. Aspect did not refer to EPR “elements of reality” and he proceeded
straightforwardly with the Lu¨ders projection postulate [12]. We remark that the projection
postulate is often referred as the von Neumann- Lu¨ders postulate or even simply the
von Neumann postulate. However, von Neumann [13] sharply distinguished the cases of
observables with non-degenerate and degenerate spectra. For the later case, he considered
a more general form of the state transformation generated by observation back-action; in
particular, by von Neumann a pure initial state can be transferred into a mixed state, as
in the modern theory of quantum instruments [14, 15]. EPR used the projection postulate
for arbitrary observables, i.e., as was later formalized by Lu¨ders [12].
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(cf. [16]-[22], [6]). What does quantum theory say about (non)violation
of the Bell inequalities? In this framework, violation vs. satisfaction
of such inequalities is equivalent to local incompatibility vs. compati-
bility of observables. These inequalities shouls be treated as statistical
tests for the complementarity principle (see section 8).
However, one can say that the genuine quantum viewpoint on the
Bell inequalities is not interesting. The essence of these inequalities
is in their derivation on the basis of the Bell model with hidden vari-
ables [23]-[26]. In this paper, we want to terminate this line of thinking
by showing that the Bell hidden variables project is in striking con-
tradiction with quantum foundations. To see this, one need not to
derive any inequality. From the very beginning (already by setting
the hidden variable model), it is clear that Bell’s model confronts with
the fundamental principle of QM, the Bohr complementarity principle
(see Bohr [27] and also [28, 29, 30]) and, in particular, the Heisenberg
uncertainty principle. Thus, now we do not criticize the derivations
and interpretations of the Bell type inequalities (cf. [31]-[39]). We
stress that by starting with the Bell’s hidden variables one goes to a
Crusade against complementarity.
If one accepts this viewpoint, then the following natural question
immediately arises: Why should the complementarity principle be vi-
olated only for compound systems? (If it were violated.) It seems that
there is no reason for this. And studies on intrasystem entanglement
(of the degrees of freedom of say a single atom) and, in particular,
classical entanglement (of the degrees of freedom of say classical elec-
tromagnetic field) confirm this viewpoint (see [40] for a review and [4]
for coupling of classical entanglement and complementarity).
It is often said that the aim of the Bell hidden variables project
was explanation of the long distance correlations (see Appendix 2);
we discuss this question in section 5. We stress that Bell’s attempt of
explanation is based on the rejection of the complementarity principle.
It seems that the price of such an attempt is too high.
By struggling with Bell nonlocality and opposing it to the com-
plementarity principle, it is worth to find the physical seed of this
principle. This seed is the Bohr quantum postulate [41, 42, 43, 27]
declaring the existence of indivisible quantum of action (Planck quan-
tum). Thus, resolution of long debates on quantum nonlocality (Ap-
pendix 1), action at a distance, Bell inequalities is possible only on
the basis of this postulate. This crucial issue is totally missed in these
debates.
We recall (in section 7) Bohr’s and Heinsenberg’s viewpoints on the
quantum postulate, especially Heinsenberg’s comparison of the exis-
tence of quantum of action (h 6= 0) with finiteness of light’s velocity
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(c <∞) and its independence of the inertial frame [41, 42, 27].
In section 7, we recall the practically forgotten paper of Zeilinger
[44] in that he looked for the fundamental principles of QM similar to
the principles of special relativity. The quantum postulate definitely
plays the crucial role in formulation of these fundamental principles
(section 7). This postulate can be considered as the physical seed
of the Bohr principle of complementarity. The latter is one of the
fundamental principle of QM. But, this principle is about observations,
the way of extracting of information about quantum systems. This
is an epistemological principle [45, 46, 28, 29].2 The Bohr’s quantum
postulate is ontic, it is about physical reality as it is.
Similarly to Einstein’s formulation of the relativity principle on
light’s velocity [55], we formulate the quantum action principle based
of the Bohr quantum postulate (section 7). Following von Weizsa¨cker
[62] and Atmanspacher and Primas [45, 46], we consider QM as an
epistemic theory, a theory about knowledge (see also [47, 48]). So,
the quantum action principle is the epistemic counterpart of Bohr’s
quantum postulate on the existence of indivisible quantum of action,
this postulate is of the ontic nature.
This is a good place to recall the recent attempts to derive the
quantum formalism from “natural probabilistic and information prin-
ciples”, e.g., in [51]-[54]. This activity differs from our attempt (fol-
lowing Zeilinger [44]) to formulate the fundamental principles of QM.
We do not try to derive its mathematical formalism. The latter can
be compared with the dressing for the main dish, we want to test the
dish without dressing.
We start with the comparative analysis of the views of Einstein,
Podolsky, and Rosen and Bell (sections 2, 3). Typically one consid-
ers Bell as the follower of EPR and claims that the Bell inequality
is straightforwardly related to the EPR-pradox. It seems that this
viewpoint is misleading. Then we point (section 4) that by consider-
ing Bell’s hidden variables model, one struggles against the comple-
mentarity principle and, in fact, against the existence of the Planck
quantum of action.
Would one like to “explain” the long distance correlations by the
cost of confronting again with the ultraviolet (RayleighJeans) catas-
trophe and rejecting the original Planck work on the black body radi-
2During his life Bohr presented a variety of versions of the complementarity principle.
In papers [3, 5, 49], I expressed my vision on Bohr’s ideas as the block of sub-principles (see
section 8). I think that such a compact formulation of Bohr’s principles is important for
further discussions of the type “Bohr vs. Bell” [3]. Nowadays, the Bohr complementarity
principle is discussed only by philosophers, e.g., in [28, 29, 30], in the form of citations
followed by long discussions.
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ation? (see section 5).
2 EPR
The EPR paper [9] was directed against the Copenhagen interpreta-
tion of the wave function. Since this interpretation has many versions
(Plotnitsky even proposed to speak about interpretations in the spirit
of Copenhagen [28, 29]), it is important to specify the EPR treatment
of this interpretation.
Copenhagen interpretation (EPR) Wave function (quantum
state) ψ represents the state of an individual quantum system.
It is important to stress that “state” is interpreted epistemically as
representing knowledge about possible outcomes of measurements on
the system in the state ψ. So, ψ is not the ontic state - not the state
of the system as it is, i.e., without relation to external observations.
State’s interpretation in the EPR-paper is very close the modern in-
formation interpretations used in quantum information theory. This
point has not been so much highlighted (see, however, [62, 45, 46, 56]).
By this interpretation the quantum mechanical description based
on the wave function representation of the state of a quantum system
is complete. The complete physical theory is defined as follows [9]:
any element of physical reality have a counterpart in the physical theory.
The EPR-reasoning was based on two basic quantum mechanical princi-
ples:
• reduction of the wave function (the projection postulate) resulting from
measurement’s back-action;
• the Heisenberg uncertainty principle.
The latter was formulated as follows: “It is shown in quantum mechanics
that, if the operators corresponding to two physical quantities, say A and B,
do not commute, AB 6= BA, then the precise knowledge of one of them pre-
cludes such a knowledge of the other. Furthermore, any attempt to determine
the latter experimentally will alter the state of the system in such a way as
to destroy the knowledge of the first.”
EPR showed that the assumption that QM (endowed with the Copen-
hagen interpretation) is a complete theory implies violation of the Heisenberg
uncertainty principle. Since they were sure in validity of this principle, EPR
concluded that the quantum mechanical description of nature is incomplete.
We emphasize that EPR did not question the validity of the Heisenberg
principle (see Appendix 3). If it would be possible to violate this principle,
then assigning to the same system two wave functions which are eigenfunc-
tions of observables represented by non-commutative operators would not
lead to any problem (Appendix 3).
Thus, by concluding that “... the wave function does not provide a com-
plete description of the physical reality, we left open the question of whether
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or not such a description exists” and believing “...that such a theory is pos-
sible”, they do not dream for a theory violating the Heisenberg’s uncertainty
principle. By reading later works of Einstein we can guess that he wanted
to construct a classical field model underlying QM [57] (see Appendix 4 for
such an attempt).
We remark that EPR did not question validity of quantum mechanical
description, they were just looking for a more detailed description. But, this
deeper description should respect the basic principles of QM, including the
uncertainty and complementarity principles.
3 Bell
Although Bell started his paper [23] with referring to the EPR paper as
proving incompleteness of QM, his model with hidden variables has not so
much to do with the EPR-dream for a complete physical theory generalizing
QM. It is surprising that this inconsistency has never been emphasized in
numerous papers on Bell’s inequality (see, e.g., Aspect [?]). The main differ-
ence of Bell’s model from the EPR-dream is that his model is in the striking
contradiction with the quantum mechanical description, especially with the
Heisenberg uncertainty principle (see Appendix 3).
Consider Bell’s random variables A(a, λ), B(b, λ) representing observ-
ables of Alice and Bob, respectively. Surprisingly, Bell did not highlighted
that, besides probabilities pa,b(x, y) = p(A(a, λ) = x,B(b, λ) = y) for com-
patible observables, Bell’s model describes probabilities pa,a′(x1, x2) = p(A(a, λ) =
x1, A(a, λ) = x2) for generally incompatible observables (represented by non-
commuting operators.3 From the very beginning, i.e., without any Bell’s type
inequality, this assumption contradicts to QM-representation of observables
and, hence, to the Heisenberg uncertainty principle (or more generally to the
Bohr complementarity principle).
Of course, Bell may proceed with his special class of subquantum models,
but without identification of the values of his random variables with values of
quantum observables and without identification of “hidden correlations” with
the experimental correlations. (De Broglie emphasized [59] this viewpoint.)
But, Bell wanted experimental verification...
Thus, from the very beginning Bell’s model of hidden variables was de-
signed as contradicting the uncertainty principle. Therefore, it is not sur-
prising that, as was shown in my recent paper [1], violation-satisfaction
of the CHSH-inequality can be formulated in terms of noncommutativity-
commutativity of operators representing local observables of Alice and Bob,
respectively.
4 Crusade against complementarity
The Heisenberg uncertainty principle was the starting point for Bohr’s for-
mulation of the complementarity principle [41]-[43] (see my recent papers
3This problem is especially clear in consideration of CHSH-inequality [26].
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[3, 1, 49] for non-philosophers gently presentation of this principle, see also
section 8). Thus, in the light of above consideration, we can say that in fact
Bell’s argument was directed against the Bohr complementarity principle.
This Crusade against complementarity was overshadowed by nonlocality is-
sue (Appendix 1). Of course, it is clear that rejection of complementarity
principle (or Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle) would have similar catas-
trophic consequences even for non-compound systems, say a single atom or
neutron, as we can see from so-called contextuality tests (see, e.g., [60]).
In short, we can say that to discard the Bell model with hidden vari-
ables, there is no need to derive inequalities and test them experimentally
(of course, if one believes in the basic principles of QM.)4 The main impact
of experimental tests [61]-[65] is demonstration that quantum correlations
(predicted by QM) are preserved for long distances. The latter plays the
crucial role in quantum engineering. However, correlations preservation can
be checked directly without inequalities. Moreover, by operating with say
CHSH-combination of correlations experimenter can miss mutual compensa-
tion of deviations from QM. In Aspect’s pioneer experiment [66], correlations
did not match the quantum prediction, but they mystically compensated
each other to violate the Bell inequality (see [67] for discussion). (In spite of
numerous discussions with experimenters, I am still not sure that data from
the basic experiments on say CHSH-inequality is clean from the mentioned
Aspect-type anomaly. Papers typically present only the CHSH-correlation
combination, but not separate correlations for pairs of experimental settings.)
5 Explaining: long distance correla-
tions vs. violation of complementarity
principle
Typically, followers of the Bell argument (that has not so much to do with
the original EPR-argument) say they want to explain the long distance cor-
relations (see Appendix 2). I think that the essence of the problem is in the
word “explain”.
In science, we operate with mathematical models of physical processes.
So, “explain” means “to describe by some mathematical model”. And quan-
tum mathematics, as a mathematical model, describes perfectly the long
distance correlations: entangled states and projection type measurements.
So, it seems that Bell and his followers have something different in mind.
Why Bell was not satisfied with the quantum mechanical description?
From reading Bell, I have the impression that he “simply” wanted to
re-establish realism of classical physics. But, what is the main quantum
barrier for such realism? Everybody knows this very well, this is the Bohr
complementarity principle with starting point at the Heisenberg uncertainty
4If one does not, she should say explicit about this, about her battle with the quantum
postulate.
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relation.5 And this is clearly stated in the EPR-paper. So, Bell and his
followers have to say: we want to break the Heisenberg uncertainty relations.
Unfortunately, it was never stated explicitly. Instead, people operate with
such an ambiguous notion as “local realism”.
Suppose somebody, say Alice, questions the Heisenberg uncertainty prin-
ciple. Then, why should she consider compound systems? Does she think
that these principle is violated only for compound systems? It would be
really strange. Thus, before trying to explain the long distance correlations
with the Bell-type hidden variables model, it would be reasonable to try
explain incompatibility of observables corresponding spin projections to dif-
ferent axes or incompatibility of position and momentum observables.
The main feature of the Bell model with hidden variables, the feature
crying for justification, is violation of the complementarity principle. It is
not so natural to try to“explain” long distance correlations without any
attempt to explain violation of this principle.
6 The root of complementarity: Devil
is in the Planck constant
Thus, by starting the anti-complementarity battle it is useful to remind the
foundational roots of complementarity. The Bohr’s complementarity princi-
ple will be discussed in detail in section 8.
For Bohr, the root of the complementarity is the existence of indivisible
quantum of action given by the Planck constant h. The existence of this
quantum prevents separation of the genuine physical features of a system
from the features of interaction with a measurement apparatus. So, the seed
of the Bohr complementarity principle is the Planck constant h.
It is meaningless to start a Crusade against complementarity without
trying to understand the origin of this fundamental quantum of action in
nature. Neither Einstein nor Bell tried to perform such investigation; in
fact, neither Bohr nor Heisenberg, for them this is just the feature of nature
such as, e.g., the constancy of light’s velocity c. And, for the moment, this
position can be considered as the only possible.
7 Quantum action principle
We recall that Zeilinger was looking for the fundamental principle of QM
[44], similar to Einstein’s principle of relativity:
The laws of physics are invariant (i.e. identical) in all inertial frames of
reference.
And he formulated the following principle of quantization of information:
An elementary system represents the truth value of one proposition.
Surprisingly, in his paper [44] Zeilinger did not mention the Bohr comple-
mentarity principle. In fact, Zeilinger’s postulate is nothing else than Bohr’s
5See Bohr [41], “... an independent reality in the ordinary physical sense can neither
be ascribed to the phenomena nor to the agencies of observation.”
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statement on quantum phenomenon. The latter can be considered as a part
of the complementarity principle (see, especially, my recent papers [4]). We
shall be back to this issue in section 8.
Now we recall that theory of special relativity is based on two Einstein’s
principles, and the second one is about light’s velocity:
The speed of light in a vacuum is the same for all observers, regardless
of the motion of the light source or observer.
(In particular, this principle presumes finiteness of light’s velocity.) We
now point to the close quantum analog of this principle.
Bohr stressed [41] that the essence of quantum theory “may be expressed
in the so-called quantum postulate, which attributes to any atomic process
an essential discontinuity, or rather individuality, completely foreign to the
classical theories and symbolised by Planck’s quantum of action.” On the
basis of Bohr’s quantum postulate, we formulate the following principle of
QM that can be considered as the analog of Einstein’s second principle:
Quantum action principle: Quantum of action is the same for all
observers, regardless experimental contexts.
We can say that this principle is the epistemic counterpart of the Bohr’s
quantum postulate. The formulation of the quantum action principle involves
observables, but the quantum postulate, the existence in nature of indivisible
quantum of action, is about nature as it is, i.e., this is the ontic postulate.
Nowadays, it is practically forgotten that by formulating the uncertainty
principle Heisenberg pointed to the analogy with the light velocity constraint
in special relativity. This analogy was then emphasized by Bohr [41, 42]. In
this paper, Bohr used the term “reciprocal uncertainty” for the Heisenberg
uncertainty relation. (This reciprocity is related to position and momentum.)
“Heisenberg has rightly compared the significance of this law of reciprocal
uncertainty for estimating the self-consistency of quantum mechanics with the
significance of the impossibility of transmitting signals with a velocity greater
than that of light for testing the self-consistency of the theory of relativity. ...
Planck’s discovery has brought before us a situation similar to that brought
about by the discovery of the finite velocity of light.”
For the formulation of the complementarity principle, the concrete value
of the Planck constant is not important. It is important only that this
quantum of action exists, h 6= 0. In the same way, the concrete value of
light’s velocity is not important for formulation of special relativity, i.e., it
is only important that it is finite, c < ∞. We also stress that constancy of
action quantum, its independence of observable (measurement procedure),
plays the crucial role in QM, as well as constancy of lights velocity in special
relativity.
What are other principles of quantum theory? We shall discuss this
problem in section 8.
8 Bohr’s complementarity principle
In 1949, Bohr [27] presented the essence of complementarity in the following
widely citing statement:
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This crucial point ... implies the impossibility of any sharp separation be-
tween the behaviour of atomic objects and the interaction with the measuring
instruments which serve to define the conditions under which the phenom-
ena appear. In fact, the individuality of the typical quantum effects finds its
proper expression in the circumstance that any attempt of subdividing the phe-
nomena will demand a change in the experimental arrangement introducing
new possibilities of interaction between objects and measuring instruments
which in principle cannot be controlled. Consequently, evidence obtained un-
der different experimental conditions cannot be comprehended within a single
picture, but must be regarded as complementary in the sense that only the to-
tality of the phenomena exhausts the possible information about the objects.
By analyzing this Bohr’s statement, I propose [3, 1, 49] to present the
Bohr complementarity principle as the following five interconnected princi-
ples:
• Contextuality: Irreducible dependence of measurement’s output on
the experimental context.
• Context complementarity: Existence of complementary experi-
mental contexts.
• Individuality: Discreteness of quantum measurements -generation of
physical phenomena.
• Completeness: Complementary observations provide complete infor-
mation about system’s state.
In this formulation, the complementarity principle can be treated as an epis-
temological principle (see, especially, paper [49] on coupling to quantum
information theory).
Typically, one identifies the Bohr complementarity principle with Con-
text complementarity. However, the above citation implies combination
of all four “sub-principles.” Besides Context complementarity, the prin-
ciples Contextuality and Completeness also attract some attention, but
Individuality is completely ignored, although it plays the crucial role in
distinguishing quantum theory from e.g. classical electromagnetism (see
[4]). By this principle quantum measurements generate discrete events cor-
responding to interaction of individual quantum systems, say photons or
electrons, with measuring devices. Such discrete events are clicks of photo-
detectors or points on the screen with photo-emulsion in the diffraction ex-
periments. Bohr call them phenomena. For him, only phenomena can be
considered as “elements of reality”. We now cite Bohr:
“I advocate the application of the word phenomenon exclusively to re-
fer to the observations obtained under specific circumstances including an
account of the whole experimental arrangement. In such terminology, the
observational problem is free of any special intricacy since, in actual exper-
iments, all observations are expressed by unambiguous statements referring,
for instance, to the registration of the point at which an electron arrives
at a photographic plate. Moreover, speaking in such a way is just suited
to emphasize that the the appropriatephysical interpretation of the symbolic
quantum mechanical formalism amounts only to predictions, of determinate
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or statistical character, pertaining to individual phenomena appearing under
conditions defined by classical physical concepts.” ([27],v. 2, p. 64]
It seems that Zelinger’s principle of information quantization is just an
information reformulation of Bohr’s principle of individuality of quantum
phenomena.6
Besides Individuality, in the above citation Bohr also emphasizedCon-
textuality, an account of the whole experimental arrangement. We remark
that, for to Bohr, Contextuality principle is a consequence of Quantum
action principle. Indivisibility of quantum of action implies irreducible
dependence of measurement’s output on the experimental context. Logically
Contextuality should generally imply Context complementarity, since
the possibility to combine any group of experimental contexts into a single
context for join measurement of observables is really surprising. For me, the
real surprise is not that some experimental contexts are incompatible, e.g.,
contexts for measurement of position and momentum in QM, but that in
some theories, e.g., classical physics, it is assumed mutual compatibility of
any pair of contexts.
We complete this section with the remark that in discussions related to
violation of the Bell type inequalities the term “contextuality” is used in
the very restricted meaning, as dependence on measurement of a compatible
observable [24]. In the present paper, as well as in my previous works, e.g.,
[74], “contextuality” was used to note dependence on a general experimental
context (“whole experimental arrangement”). To speak about contextuality,
we need not to consider two observables; we can speak, e.g., about the context
of position measurement or the context of measurement of the concrete spin
projection.
9 Fundamental principles of quantum
mechanics
The above considerations lead to the fundamental principles of QM:
1. Quantum action principle.
2. Bohr’s complementarity principle.
We consider QM as an epistemic theory [62, 45, 46, 56, 47], a theory about
extraction of knowledge about nature; in terminology of Hertz and Boltz-
mann this is observational theory [75, 76, 77, 48]. So, these two principles
provide the epistemic foundations of quantum theory.
The quantum action principle is the direct consequence of the quantum
postulate (the ontic principle about nature as it is), the second quantum
6 We remark once again that Bohr considered the complementarity principle as an
epistemological principle, as a principle about extraction of information about features of
quantum systems with the aid of measurement devices. In fact, Bohr’s views match very
well with modern development of quantum information theory (see Plotnitsky [28, 29],
Jaeger [68, 69]), including the information interpretation of QM (Zeilinger-Brukner [44,
70, 71]), QBism [72, 73], and information reconstruction of quantum theory [51]-[54].
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principle (complementarity) is based on the first quantum principle. But
their interrelation is complicated (see [3, 1, 49]).
Of course, these principles do not provide representation of QM as a
closed formal system. However, in spite of a rather common opinion, even
Einstein’s relativity based on the principle of relativity and constancy of
light’s velocity cannot be treated as such a closed system, see Einstein’s own
comment on this issue (citation is taken from book [55]):
“The principle of relativity, or, more exactly, the principle of relativity
together with the principle of the constancy of the velocity of light, is not
to be conceived as a “complete system,” in fact, not as a system at all, but
merely as a heuristic principle which, when considered by itself, contains
only statements about rigid bodies, clocks, and light signals. It is only by
requiring relations between otherwise seemingly unrelated laws that the theory
of relativity provides additional statements.”
10 Concluding remarks
First of all, we emphasize that
• EPR-paper [9] was not directed against the Heisenberg uncertainty and
Bohr complementarity principles;
• Bell’s works, see, e.g., [23]-[25] and further works in Bell’s paradigm,
e.g., [26], were straightforwardly directed against these principles.
However, Bell believed [23] that he is in one boat with EPR. And this belief
spread throughout the quantum community.
The recent years were marked by the tremendous success of experimen-
talists performing the Bell type tests [63]-[65]. In the light of this paper (as
well as [1]), these tests can be considered as the excellent confirmation of the
validity of the Bohr complementarity principle. They also confirmed that
the correlations predicted withing the quantum theory can be preserved at
long distances. In this paper, we do not try to provide “deeper explanation”
of these correlations than given by the quantum formalism (see a short re-
mark at the very end of Appendix 1). We just wanted to point that the
attempt of their “explanation” in the Bell framework was suspicious from
the very beginning (i.e., without derivation of any inequality), as an attempt
to disprove the complementarity principle.
The ontological seed of the complementarity principle is the quantum ac-
tion postulate. Therefore rejection of complementarity is impossible without
rejection of the existence of indivisible quantum of action.
Following [44], we searched for the fundamental principles of QM. These
are two principles, the quantum action and complementarity principles. The
first principle is the epistemological representation of the quantum action
postulate.
Finally, I conclude that if the quantum foundations are presented as
in section 7, i.e., similarly to the foundations of special relativity, then the
attempts to go beyond the complementarity principle, e.g., with hidden vari-
ables of the Bell type, can be compared with the attempts to go beyond special
relativity, by rejecting Einstein’s principle on constancy of light’s velocity.
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Appendix 1: Two faced Janus of quan-
tum nonlocality
The first time Lu¨ders nonlocalty was briefly mentioned in EPR-paper [9] as
the absurd alternative to incompleteness of QM. During the Einstein-Bohr
debate non of the debaters considered this alternative seriously. Unfortu-
nately, Einstein mentioned nonlocality at a few other occasions and high-
lighted it in [7] with the shicky slogan, “spooky action at a distance.” This
sort of nonlocality is the straightforward consequence of using the projection
postulate in combination with the Copenhagen interpretation: the quantum
state is the state of the individual quantum system. We remark that the
Copenhagen interpretation has many versions. Plotnitsky even proposed to
speak about the interpretations in the spirit of Copenhagen. We characterize
such interpretations by emphasizing the individual character of a state. The
alternative interpretation is the statistical or ensemble interpretation. Here
the quantum state characterizes the features of an ensemble of identically
prepared quantum systems.
Lu¨ders nonlocalty: The state update as back-action of measurement
is mathematically formalized by the Lu¨ders projection postulate. For a com-
pound system S = (S1, S2), measurement on S1 with the concrete output
A = a “instantaneously” modifies the state of S2. Here, the crucial role is
played by a meaning of “instantaneously”. In what space? If one follows
the individual interpretation of the state, then this instantaneous change
happens in physical space. One really can imagine that this instantaneous
change is a consequence of spooky action at a distance.
However, as was explained in very detail in [5], if one uses the statisti-
cal interpretation of a quantum state, then “instantaneous” is related not to
physical space, but to information space. There is nothing special in “instan-
taneous” change of information. The same happens in process of probability
update in classical probability theory. Here states of random systems are rep-
resented by probability measures. One also might say that such state changes
instantaneously. But, nobody describes this situation as nonlocality.
Bell nonlocality. This is nonlocality of of some subquantum models
invented by Bell and known as models with hidden variables [23]-[26]. The
existence of such models is not surprising at all, human imagination is power-
ful and it can generates a variety of mathematical structures that have noth-
ing to do with physics. How does one couple Bell nonlocality with quantum
physics? Bell proposed to compare correlations described by subquantum
models with quantum correlations, theoretical and experimental. As was
pointed out in [5], the Bell project does not take into account the ontic-
epistemic structure of scientific theories. Already Hertz [75] and Boltzmann
[76, 77] (and later Schro¨dinger [78]) emphasized this difference: theoretical
(causal) vs. observational models (see also [47, 48]). Bell tried to identify
outputs of the two descriptions. (This approach was strongly criticized by
De Broglie [59]. It seems that he was not aware about the works of Hertz,
Boltzmann, Schro¨dinger. However, their views coincide.)
As was shown in [1], the Bell type inequalities can be considered in
the purely quantum framework, as inequalities for correlations described
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by quantum theory. In this framework, violation vs. satisfaction of these
inequalities is equivalent to local incompatibility vs. compatibility of quan-
tum observables. Hence, paper [?] demonstrated that these inequalities are
statistical tests for the Bohr complementarity principle (in particular, the
Heisenberg uncertainty principle).
Appendix 2: Long distance correlations
QM endowed with the statistical interpretation does not suffer from Lu¨ders
nonlocality and by operating in the purely quantum framework one can com-
pletely ignore Bell nonlocality. However, my opponents say that you cannot
operate in the purely quantum framework, that quantum physics really cry
for subquantum explanation of long distance correlations which cannot be
explained in the quantum framework. We repeat that one should be very
careful by using the word “explanation”. The only possible scientific mean-
ing of this word is “construction of a proper mathematical model”. But,
with this formulation we again meet the meaning problem, now with the
word “proper”. I think that Bohr, Heisenberg, or Fock considered QM as
a proper model “explaining” the long distance correlations with entangled
states. However, it seems that Bell did not consider the quantum model
as satisfactory for “explanation” of these correlations. Why? Because of
the acausal character of quantum measurements. He wanted to reestablish
causality.
Appendix 3: EPR vs. Bell in relation
to Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle
As was emphasized already in the abstract of EPR-paper [9], EPR did not
question Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle:
“In quantum mechanics in the case of two physical quantities described
by non-commuting operators, the knowledge of one precludes the knowledge
of the other. Then either (1) the description of reality given by the wave
function in quantum mechanics is not complete or (2) these two quantities
cannot have simultaneous reality. Consideration of the problem of making
predictions concerning a system on the basis of measurements made on an-
other system that had previously interacted with it leads to the result that
if (1) is false then (2) is also false. One is thus led to conclude that the
description of reality as given by a wave function is not complete.”
It is clear that EPR cannot even imagine that (2), i.e., Heisenberg’s un-
certainty principle, is false. For them, it was clear that these two quantities
(incompatible observables) cannot have simultaneous reality. In Bell’s model
with hidden variables, quantities A(a, λ) and A(a′, λ) have simultaneous re-
ality. (Here a and a′ are orientations of Alice’s beam splitter.) One may
say that this Bellian reality, a part of local realism, differs from EPR-reality,
“the possibility of predicting it with certainty, without disturbing the system.”
One may say that EPR wrote about experimental predictions, but generally
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A(a, λ) and A(a′, λ) are components of some mathematical model, just a pos-
sible human image of a causal subquantum model. This is the good point.
But, Bell did not proceed in this way. He simply identified the values of
random variables of hidden variables with outcomes of quantum observables,
the real physical observables. The latter couples of Bellian (hidden variables)
reality with the EPR (outcome prediction) reality. So, Bell’s introduction
of hidden variables contradicts even the statement in the abstract of the
EPR-paper ...
Finally, I remind that this viewpoint was presented a long ago by De
Broglie as his reaction to Bell’s inequality [59].
Appendix 4: Reestablishing causality
Can one reestablish causality without contradicting to Heisenberg’s uncer-
tainty principle? I think that the answer is “yes” and the corresponding
mathematical model was constructed in a series of my papers, see, e.g.,
[79, 80, 81]. Of course, such reestablishing cannot be done in such a trivial
way as in the Bell model with hidden variables, i.e., though simple iden-
tification of the values of functions of hidden variables with experimental
outcomes.
In [79, 80, 81], I developed prequantum classical statistical field theory
(PCSFT), reproducing quantum probabilities and correlations within the-
ory of classical random fields. PCSFT is a kind of hidden variables model,
but the values of classical random variables, functions of classical random
fields, are not identified with the outcomes of quantum observables. The
PCSFT-counterpart of a quantum observable which is represented by Her-
mitian operator A are given by quadratic form fA(φ) = 〈φ|A|φ〉. The range
of values of fA does not coincides with the spectrum of A. In particular, if A
has the spectrum {−1,+1}, the range of values of fA is not bounded by 1.
Correlations of such quadratic forms can violate the Bell-type inequalities.
PCSFT is a causal theoretical model for the observational model, QM
(see Hertz and Boltzmann [75, 76, 77], see also [47, 48]). PCSFT can be
straightforwardly connected with observations through mapping onto QM.
However, If one is looking for causal coupling with observations, then PCSFT
has to be endowed with its own observation theory. Such a theory should de-
scribe generation of measurement outputs from quadratic forms φ→ fA(φ).
The first steps towards such PCSFT-based measurement theory were done
in [81]. This measurement theory is based on detectors of the threshold type.
It does not violate the Heisenberg uncertainty nor the Bohr complementarity
principles. (However, the role of indivisible quantum of action in this theory
has not yet been clarified.) In particular, the PCSFT-generated observa-
tional model reproduces violation of the CHSH inequality for discrete clicks
of detectors (of the threshold type) [80]. This model has nontrivial coupling
with the temporal structure of measurements, in particular, their constrain-
ing by time-coincidence of detections for Alice’s and Bob’s detectors.
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